



The struggle of one type of business concern to protect itself against competitive
encroachments either from new forms of business, or merely from additions to its
ranks of more of the same type of competitors,1 is probably as old as man himself.
For where self-interest resides, there one finds resourcefulness in the fashioning of
protective weapons. And for each weapon that is removed, judicially or otherwise,
from the hands of its fashioners, new ones spring forth from the fertile minds
behind those hands. Even as early man devised tangible weapons to wield against
encroaching competitors in the form of human or animal enemies who threatened
his food supply, so the modern man eternally attempts to devise intangible weapons
to wield against threats to his established form of livelihood.
The man in the business of marketing goods or services today finds his livelihood
threatened, among other ways, by the competition created through the evolution of
those new forms of distribution achieved by the horizontal or vertical integration
of previously separate products or functions. Horizontally, the threat to existing
merchandising patterns takes the form of integration in one business unit, or under
common ownership, of what might be designated as unrelated lines of business or
merely as the marketing of many goods or services instead of one or a limited num-
ber. Through vertical integration, the old-line seller is faced with combination in
one unit of either production and distribution or the various stages of the distribution
process itself.
To meet this competition, or the threat of it, resort is had to the legal weapon
of protective legislation, though an attempt is made to disguise the real purpose in
its use under the gaudy trappings of declarations that it is all done in the interest of
protecting the public against practices dangerous to its health 2 or practices promotive
of monopoly.3 Such attack invites resistance, for the newly developing forms of dis-
0 A.B., 1929, Goucher College; LL.B., 1932, Columbia University. Assistant Administrative Attorney,
Marketing Laws Survey.
' For a discussion of the efforts of business to protect itself against this form of competition, see
Silverman, Bennett and Lechliter, Control by Licensing Over Entry into the Market, supra this issue, an
example of which is the adoption by mere occupational groups (barbers and beauty culturists, and other
service trades) of a "professional" status with concomitantly stringent requirements set up for entry
therein.
5 See, infra, the discussion of legislation restricting the sale of food to food establishments, and the
sale of drugs to registered pharmacists.
5 See, injra, the discussion of restrictions on the retail merchandising of appliances by public utilities,
on the ownership of theaters by motion picture producers, and on the wholesaling of groceries by the
meat-packing companies.
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tribution also have wanted to survive and grow. Here, too, we find the struggle
clothed in gaudy phraseology of "personal liberties" and the right of free men to
engage in all lawful pursuits. In speaking of the Missouri anti-department store
law of 1899,' the then President of the American Bar Association said:"
Did the lawmakers desire precedent for the attempted destruction of department
stores, they could have found absolute prohibition of the carrying on of more than one
business, under heavy penalties, among the discarded rubbish of the English law in
statutes of the golden time when the might of kings controlled the right of subjects. It
is unnecessary to state in this presence that long ago these impositions upon personal
liberty were consigned, with many others of like import, to the dust heap.
No less immemorial is the struggle of the community to protect itself against the
inordinate use of such weapons and counter-weapons, or against their use at all,
where they may tend to give a certain class of men a monopoly of the trade without
being sufficiently justified as a protection of public interest. That this struggle, too,
is of ancient lineage, is eloquently witnessed by the proposition which the Emperor
Zeno enacted in his constitution between 474 and 491 A.D. :
We decree that no one shall be permitted to exercise a monopoly in garments of any
sort . . . nor in any commodity serving as food, or put to any other use, nor in any
fabric, be it of his own accord or in pursuance of an existing or proposed imperial edict
or pragmatic sanction of our written decree, and that no one shall enter into an unlawful
association not to sell certain commodities more cheaply than agreed. (International
Monthly, No. 5, January-June, 1902, pp. 478-479).
In a society which is rightly or wrongly based, at least theoretically, upon the
idea of a free competitive economy,7 one would assume that side would prevail
which did not foster a monopoly or monopolistic tendencies. Such is not always
the case. Each side hurls the accusation of monopoly at the, other, and to a certain
extent each is right. Integration in distribution, like concentration in production,
can produce monopolistic power which may be used to stifle competition. On the
other hand, legislation sponsored by established forms of marketing enterprise, at-
tempting to prohibit or restrict horizontal or vertical integration, itself operates in a
monopolistic manner, even though its proponents frequently attempt to justify it
'Mo. Acts 1899, p. 72, discussed at note 13, inlra.
' (1927) 48 L. R. A. 261.
'See speech of Representative Littlefield on amendments to the Sherman Act, 36 COo. REC. S836
(1903).
'The attempt to foster such an economy is eloquently attested by the growth and existence of a
large body of both state and federal anti-trust legislation, and the long line of judicial opinion upholding
it. See National Cotton Oil Co. v. Texas, X97 U. S. 115, 129 (904), in which, in upholding the anti-
trust laws of Texas, the Supreme Court of the United States said: "It is enough to say that the idea
of monopoly . . . the notion of exclusiveness . . . the suppression of competition by the unification
of interest . . . is . . . the concern of the law to prohibit. . . . And this concern and the policy
based upon it has not only expression in the Texas statutes; it has expression in the statutes of other
states and in a well-known national enactment. According to them, competition, not combination,
should be the law of trade. If there is evil in this it is accepted as less than that which may result
from unification of interest, and the power such unification gives. And that legislatures may so ordain
this court has decided."
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with the very argument that it is devised to prevent monopolistic practices8 Neces-
sarily, a law which attempts to restrict to a certain class of men the privilege of
marketing certain products, is giving such class a monopoly of that trade,9 and
setting up legislative barriers against the entrance of one-time outsiders therein.
It would seem, therefore, that the courts would frown upon such legislative
monopolies. Such, however, has not always been the result in cases testing the
legality of such restrictive legislation. Broad concepts of state police power and
the well-known judicial reluctance to invalidate a statute allegedly enacted under
such power, come into operation."0 If the control sought by the legislation can be
related "reasonably" '  to the preservation of the public health, safety, morals or
general welfare, the courts will approve it, thus perpetuating a limited monopoly
in favor of established forms of business.
PRoDuCr INTEGRATION
Legal action aimed at preventing the integration in one marketing unit of lines
or products formerly marketed by separate types of business concerns has taken
interpretation of the language of the Sherman Act to prohibit the vending of
several forms: (I) the abortive anti-department store laws of the late nineteenth
century; (2) restrictions on the retailing of appliances by public utilities; (3) an
"groceries" by those engaged in the meat-packing industry; (4) the recent restaurant
meals served by drugstores and five-and-tens; (5) restrictions on motor vehicle
laws designed to protect the restaurateur from the competition of low-cost, tipless
dealers engaging in any other line of business; (6) restrictions on the retailing of
alcoholic beverages in connection with other types of commodities; (7) a long his-
tory of pharmacy laws restricting the sale of nearly all kinds of drugs and medicines
to registered pharmacists; and (8) the recent move to restrict certain product in-
tegrations among chains by including such multiple-line chains within the chain-
store tax laws while excluding single-line chains.
The first indication of a move to "go after" department stores was revealed in
two rather mild-appearing laws enacted in 1897, one in Indiana and one in Wis-
consin. These laws12 merely contained statutory authorization to cities to license
' See note 3, supra.
'See State v. Donaldson, 41 Minn. 74, 42 N. W. 781 (1889), which held invalid a provision of a
pharmacy law restricting the sale of drugs and medicines to registered pharmacists. Since there was
no exemption even for patent medicines, although the pharmacist was expressly exempted from liability
for their quality, the court said such a complete prohibition was not designed to protect the public
health but to create a monopoly in favor of the pharmacists. See, infra, the discussion of legislation
restricting the retailing of drugs.
1 See Paramount Pictures, Inc. v. Langer, 23 F. Supp. 89o (D. N. D. 1938); S. H. Kress & Co.
v. Johnson, x6 F. Supp. 5 (D. Colo. 1936), af'd per curiam, 299 U. S. 511 (1936); cf. Crescent Cotton
Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 257 U. S. 129 (1921) (integration in production).
"See the long line of decisions originating with Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 678 (x888),
through Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61 (911); Price v. Illinois, 238 U. S. 446
(x915); Rast v. Van Deman & Lewis Co., 240 U. S. 342 (1915); Standard Oil Co. v. City of Marysville,
279 U. S. 582 (1929); O'Gorman & Young, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 282 U. S. 251 (1931);
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502 (934); S. H. Kress & Co. v. Johnson, supra note 10.12 Ind. Laws, 1897, c. 70; Wis. Laws, 1897, c. 373.
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and regulate department stores, but such special authorization seems to indicate an
attempt to empower municipalities to impose heavier exactions than could be justified
under their general licensing or taxing powers. In neither of these states does there
appear to have been any judicial test of these statutes.
A far more outspoken Missouri enactment" of 1899 and a contemporaneous
Chicago ordinance of like purport were, on the other hand, promptly held invalid.' 4
The state law divided merchandise into a certain number of classes which were
rearranged into groups, and anyone employing more than 15 persons was prohibited
from selling goods from more than one of the several classes or groups without
paying a license fee of from $300 to $500 for each group, no fee being required for
sales from only one group. The Chicago ordinance prohibited any meats, fish,
butter, or other provisions from being sold "where dry goods, clothing, jewelry, and
drugs are sold." Such laws were so obviously self-interest legislation procured by
the small single-line merchants in an attempt to protect themselves against the
development of the multiple-line department store, that the courts did not even
attempt to find justification for them. 5
Since the early 193o's numerous bills have been introduced in state legislatures
to prohibit public utilities from selling gas and electrical appliances to their cus-
tomers.' However, only two have succeeded in enactment, one in Kansas and one
in Oklahoma.' 7 The Oklahoma statute has not been litigated, but the Kansas law
was promptly held invalid by the supreme court of the state.' After determining
that appliance sales are a natural incidence of a utility's power to sell and distribute
'3 See note 4, supra.
z'State cx rel. Wyatt v. Ashbrook, 154 Mo. 375, 55 S. W. 627 (i9oo); Chicago v. Nechter, 183
Ill. 104, 55 N. E. 707 (1899). The authority claimed for the Chicago ordinance, which was obviously
aimed at department stores, was the statutory power of the city to regulate the sale of meats and all
other provisions. See, infra, note 65 and text for the provisions of this ordinance, likewise judicially
condemned, prohibiting the sale of packaged liquors in such stores.
"In striking down the Missouri law, the court said: ". . no reason has been given or suggested,
and to our minds, none can be conceived why the arbitrary selection of persons . . . having . . . for
sale, in the same store or building, under a unit of management or superintendency, at retail, . . . any
articles or goods . . .of more than one of the several classifications or groups .. . designated, when 15
or more people are employed, was . . . made, for the imposition of the license fee . . . from which
all other persons and merchants of the State are exempted." State ex rel. Wyatt v. Ashbrook, supra
note 14, at 395-396, 55 S. XV. at 632. Compare, the judicial attitude toward the so-called restaurant
laws, discussed infra, and revealed in S. H. Kress & Co. v. Johnson, supra note zo.
"Legis. (1937) 22 IowA L. REv. 736, 741; Merchandising Electrical Appliances, A Report of the
Electrical Merchandising Joint Committee (1933). The National Electrical Manufacturers Association,
in a letter dated March 3, 1941, states that in the last four years, 1937-1940, 21 bills were introduced
in various states, but none enacted, and that to date in 1941 bills have been introduced in Connecticut
and Massachusetts.
"'KAN. GEN. STAT. (Corrick, 1935) §66-i2io; OKLA. STmr. ANN. (1936) tit. 18, §72. "It shall
be unlawful for any public service corporation in this state, directly or indirectly, to engage in the
sale of merchandise, utensils, or chattels of any sort not directly connected with the general business
of such public service corporation as authorized by its charter, except as herein before provided.
Nothing herein shall be construed to prohibit any public service company from selling fuse plugs,
electric light bulbs, outlet plugs, sockets, extension cords, or other repairs or equipment necessary to
maintain continuity of service to any patron or patrons of such Company." Ibid.
" Capital Gas & Electric Co. v. Boynton, i37 Kan. 77, 22 P. (2d) 958 (1933).
RESTRICTIONS ON MARKETING INTEGRATION
gas, electricity and other public utility services,19 the court held that the statute
"appears to be strictly class legislation without any reasonable relation to the welfare
of the public."20 Proponents of the legislation attempted to argue that it was de-
signed "to prevent a monopoly," and therefore justified as an exercise of the police
power in the interests of the general welfare of the public. The Kansas court decided,
however, that the effect of the law was to create a monopoly rather than to prevent
one. "The obvious result of the enactment ... would be to limit the sale of such
appliances to merchants and others... "' With no feature of public interest there-
fore involved, to single out the utilities as a class and forbid them to merchandise
appliances was held to deny them arbitrarily the equal protection of the laws. It
should be noted that this decision was rendered in spite of the fact that the evidence
showed the utility companies sold from 8o to 90 percent of the gas appliances in the
communities where they operated and in connection with such sales performed cer-
tain functions and rendered certain services 1 which only their size and position
as a utility permitted them to do, and which, therefore, the regular appliance dealers
complained they could not match.
22
So here we have the legal seal of approval placed upon two developments of
multiple-line organization, whereas other attempts at integration of so-called unre-
lated lines have been condemned as productive of monopolistic power. Such con-
demnation was achieved through application of the general language of the Sherman
Act to the activities of the great meat-packing companies of the country, Swift,
Armour, Morris, and Cudahy. A consent decree was entered against these com-
panies in 192o,23 by the terms of which a monopolistic combination of the companies
was dissolved and the units that composed it were individually enjoined, among
"
0 The courts of the country are almost universally in accord with this view: Hamler v. City of
Jacksonville, 97 Fla. 807, 122 So. 220 (1929); Holten v. City of Camilla, 134 Ga. 56o, 68 S. E. 472
(i9io); Andrews v. City of South Haven, 187 Mich. 294, 153 N. W. 827 (1915); Milligan v. Miles
City, 51 Mont. 374, 153 Pac. 276 (1915); Malone v. Lancaster Gas Light & Fuel Co., i82 Pa.
309, 37 Ad. 932 (1897); Commonwealth ex rel. Baldridge, Atty. Gen. v. Philadelphia Electric Co., 300
Pa. 577, 151 Ad. 344 (930); Erie Lighting Co. et a. v. Penn. Public Utility Comm., 113 Pa. Super.
19
o
, 198 Ad. 9o (1938).
"'Capital Gas & Electric Co. v. Boynton, supra note I8, at 729, 22 P. (2d) at 964.
" Such as (a) liberal allowances for used appliances which bore no exact relation to the value
thereof; (2) free servicing of the appliances; and (3) charging up the loss in the operation of the
appliance department as an operating expense of the company so that it became a factor in its utility
rate structure. Capital Gas & Electric Co: v. Boynton, supra note 18, at 723-724, 22 P. (2d) at 961.
See also Andrews v. City of South Haven, supra note i9; Keen v. City of Waycross, ioi Ga. 588, 29
S. E. 42 (1897). Pennsylvania attempted to remedy this situation in 1937 by enacting a law which,
instead of prohibiting utilities from selling appliances, regulates certain practices in connection with such
sales. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1940) tit. 66, §1352, prohibiting the utility from discontinuing
utility service to a consumer for failure to pay for appliances, forbidding it to apply to the purchase
price thereof any consumer deposit, and requiring separate accounts concerning its appliance sales.
Several other states also require the keeping of separate accounts. ILL. REv. STAT. (Smith-Hurd, 1939)
C. 111 2/3, §12; S. C. CODE (Supp. 1934) §8555-2(x6); WASH. REv. STAT. ANN. (Remington, Supp.
1939) §10458-2; WIs. REV. STAT. (i939) §196-59.
"Contrast the judicial attitude displayed in Paramount Pictures, Inc. v. Langer, supra note io.
"The decree was entered in i92o in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, sitting in
equity.
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other things, from continuing to trade, either at wholesale or retail, in so-called
groceries, i.e. in certain unrelated foodstuffs not within the scope of the meat-packing
industry.24
The reasons maintained by the government for the prohibitions of this decree
were twofold. The first was that through the ownership of refrigerator cars and
branch houses as well as other facilities, the companies were in a position to dis-
tribute these foods and other unrelated commodities with substantially no increase
in overhead. Secondly, that they fixed prices for groceries so low over temporary
periods of time that the competition of less favorably situated rivals was eliminated
and they were enabled to establish a monopoly of a large part of the food supply
of the nation25
In the two cases involving this decree which reached the Supreme Court of the
United States,26 the Court refused to disturb it, thus leaving in effect the require-
ment for divorcement of lines. It is important to note here that the decree prohib-
ited the individual companies from engaging in such unrelated lines of business,
"upon the theory that even after the combination among the packers had been
broken up and the monopoly dissolved, the individual units would be so large that
the capacity to engage in other forms of business as adjuncts to the sale of meats
should be taken from them altogether."2" Here, then, we have the Sherman Act
being used, with the specific recognition of the Court, to protect an established class
of business, the wholesale grocers and produce dealers.2s
However, it is arguable whether either one of the Swift cases is necessarily per-
suasive of the point that the language of the Sherman Act can be used to prohibit
such product integration. In neither case was the Court passing directly upon the
"More specifically, it enjoined the defendants, without consent of the court, (i) from engaging or
being interested in the business of manufacturing, buying, selling or handling any one of 114 enumerated
food products or any one of 30 other named articles of commerce; (2) from selling milk or cream;
(3) from selling meat at retail; and (4) from using their distributive systems (including branch houses,
refrigerator cars, route cars, and auto trucks) in any manner for the purpose of handling any of the
many articles referred to. For other aspects of this decree, see the discussion, infra, of restrictions on
vertical forms of integration.
"
1 See United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U. S. io6 (1932). Compare this with the attitude expressed
in Capital Gas & Electric Co. v. Boynton, supra note z8, in which the Kansas high court invalidated
the prohibition on the marketing of appliances by public utilities, in spite of the fact that the very
reasons for which the regular retail dealers sponsored the law were bottomed on what they claimed
were the unfair competitive advantages which the size of the utilities gave them in such merchandising.
See Nelson-Johnston & Dowdna v. Metropolitan Utilities Dist., 291 N. W. 558 (Neb. 1940). Added
to such competitive advantages there was the objection, not present in the meat packing case, that the
utilities engage in appliance sales not for their own sake, but merely as a means to load-building, and
therefore can afford to operate their appliance departments at a loss by absorbing such loss in their
utility business. See (Mar. 11, 1939) 111 ELEcTRcAL WOaLD 689; Capital Gas & Electric Co. v.
Boynton, supra note 18.
"Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 311 (1928); United States v. Swift & Co., supra note 25.
27United States v. Swift & Co., supra note 25, at 116.
"8 "The question is . . . whether a modification as to groceries can be made [in the decree] without
prejudice to the interests of the classes whom this particular restraint was intended to protect . . .
wholesale grocers." United States v. Swift & Co., supra note 25, at 117, 118. It should be noted here,
of course, that the law has today established that the fact a statute is passed primarily in the interests
of a class, will not of itself render such statute invalid. Nebbia v. New York, supra note ii; Borden's
Farm Products Co. v. Ten Eyck, 297 U. S. 251 (1936); Paramount Pictures, Inc. v. Langer, supra note 1o.
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correctness of the inclusion within the consent decree of such a prohibition. The
1928 case came up on a motion of Swift and Armour to vacate the decree and
declare it void. Consequently, said the Court, the question was merely whether
the original court had the power to render such a decree at all. This question it
answered affirmatively and then went on to say that the defendants, by consenting
to the entry of the decree, had waived any error in decision.29
The 1932 case came before the Court in an effort of Swift and Armour to secure
a modification of the consent decree to permit the wholesaling of groceries. In
refusing to disturb the decree, the Court emphasized that the question was not one
of reviewing the decree to determine whether it was right or wrong originally, but
whether, having been made to include the collateral lines of trade with the consent
of each defendant, it should now be relaxed because of changed conditions. In
determining that sufficiently changed conditions did not exist, the Court said :a
We do not turn aside to inquire whether some of these restraints upon separate as
distinguished from joint action could have been opposed with success if the defendants
had offered opposition. Instead, they chose to consent, and the injunction, right or
wrong, became the judgment of the Court.
Closely akin to the anti-department store laws are the recent "restaurant" laws
enacted by Colorado and Wisconsin.?1 Obviously designed to protect the restaurant
from the competition of meals served by drugstores and five-and-tens, they achieve
this by prohibiting a restaurant from being operated in the same room with any
other business. But this time the judicial seal of approval was placed upon the
restriction and not upon the new form of distribution? 2 The Colorado law was
construed, in two request opinions of the Colorado Supreme Court,33 as not pro-
hibiting anyone engaged in another business from also engaging in the restaurant
business, but as merely requiring, if he wishes to be both merchant and restaurateur,
that he conduct the businesses in separate rooms. It further held that physical
connections between such rooms, such as connecting doors, were permissible? 4
"' . . . had the defendants not waived such error by their consent, they might have had it corrected
upon appeal." Swift & Co. v. United States, supra note 26, at 331.
"°United States v. Swift & Co., supra noto 25, at i16, 117.
" CoLo. STAT. ANN. (Michie, 1935) c. 8i, §§13-24; WIs. CODE (1939) §§s6o.oi-i6o.o8. Three
similar bills were introduced in the New York legislature in X94o but were not enacted. Furthermore,
a bill has been introduced in the present session of the South Dakota legislature, H. B. No. r22 (1941),
which would impose a Sio license tax on separate grocery and butcher shops, a $si,ooo license tax on
combined grocery and meat stores.
m S. H. Kress & Co4 v. Johnson, supra note so.
SIn re Interrogatories of the Governor, 97 Colo. 587, 52 P. (2d) 663 (1935), rendered at the
request of the Governor of Colorado, defendant in a suit by Kress & Co. and others, to restrain enforce-
ment of the law. S. H. Kress & Co. v. Johnson, supra note io.
"' It should be noted that the Wisconsin law in specific terms provided that a restaurant could be
conducted on the same premises as other businesses if separated therefrom by ceiling-high partitions
and self-closing doors. The Colorado law, however, provided: ". . . it shall be unlawful . . . to sell
. . . 'food' for consumption on the premises except . . . in a licensed 'restaurant,' as defined. . ..
'Restaurant' shall mean an establishment . . . whose principal business is the sale of meals, and in
which room nothing is sold excepting meals, food, drink and tobaccos. Any establishment connected
with any business whatsoever . . . wherein any business is conducted excepting the sale of meals, . . .
is hereby declared not to be a restaurant."
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Adopting this interpretation of the Colorado law as conclusive and framing the
issue after the manner of current judicial technique in such cases,85 the federal dis-
trict court, in a decision subsequently affirmed per curiam by the United States
Supreme Court, succeeded in justifying the measure as one reasonably designed to
protect the public healthY0
In doing so, the court held that against the constitutional argument of lack of
due process the presumption of constitutionality must prevail in favor of a statute
allegedly enacted in the protection of some public interest, here the public health,
even where there is a sharp conflict of opinion among experts in the field as to
whether it will tend to protect such public interest, if there is some substantial
evidence to support the view that it will. "It is plainly not enough that the subject
should be regarded as debatable. If it be debatable, the legislature is entitled to
its own judgment .... ,,3" This test of reasonableness is to be compared with that
enunciated in O'Gorman & Young, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co.,8 in which the
Court held that the presumption of constitutionality must prevail in favor of a
statute allegedly enacted under the police power, when "the record is barren of
any allegation of fact tending to show unreasonableness." 3
However, the apparent liberality of these rules in testing the constitutionality of
non-integration legislation, is limited by several factors. In the first place, in both
the Kress and O'Gorman cases the Court was assisted by the fact that the statute
on its face dealt with a general subject previously established as within the power
of the state to regulate.40 Since the end, or policy, declared by the statute in each
case was lawful on its face, the question was therefore stated to be, merely whether
the specific means provided were "reasonably" adapted to achieve this lawful end.4'
Hence if a non-integration statute does not on its face deal with a subject which
a court can recognize as having been established as within the police power, wit-
85See text and notes so and i , supra.
' S. H. Kress & Co. v. Johnson, supra note so. In affirming the decision of the district court, the
United States Supreme Court wrote no opinion, but merely cited as authority for its action, Powell v.
Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 678 (1888) (upholding oleomargarine tax law); Price v. Illinois, 238 U. S.
446 (1915) (upholding prohibition on food preservative containing boric acid); Standard Oil Co. v.
City of Marysville, 279 U. S. 582 (1929) (upholding ordinance prohibiting storage of gasoline above
ground); (4) Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502 (1934) (upholding minimum price fixing of milk).
" S. H. Kress & Co. v. Johnson, supra note so, at 8. See also Rast v. Van Deman & Lewis Co., supra
note ii, for an application of the same test in 19x5 in the Trading Stamp case.
" Supra note ii.
"Ild. at 258; ". . . the presumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual
foundation of record for overthrowing the statute. It does not appear, upon the face of the statute, or
from any facts of which the court must take judicial notice, that - . . evils did not exist .. . for which
this statutory provision was an appropriate remedy." Id. at 257, 258.
"°In the Kress case, with the regulation of the serving of food by restaurants in the interests of
the public health; in the O'Gorman case, with the regulation of the rates of insurance companies in the
interest of public welfare, see German Alliance Insurance Co. v. Lewis, 233 U. S. 389, 412 (1913).
" S. H. Kress & Co. v. Johnson, supra note io, at 7, the means in this case being the requirement
that a restaurant be conducted in a separate room from any other business; O'Gorman & Young, Inc.
v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., supra note ix, at 257, the means here being the requirement that no fire insur-
ance company could allow a commission to any person acting as its local agent respecting such insurance,
in excess of that allowed to any of its local agents on such risks in the state.
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ness the anti-department store laws2 and the public utility anti-merchandising
laws, 43 it must do more than apply one of the tests enunciated in the O'Gorman
and Kress cases. In addition to deciding the question of means, a court must first
decide the question of legislative power, or in other words, whether the end sought
is within the jurisdiction of the legislature as an exercise of the police power.44
Another possible limitation to the liberal application of the test in the Kress
case is the fact that the federal district court, despite its statements that it is not
within the province of the judiciary to disturb a legislative finding if there is evidence
to support it, even where "the evidence leaves the question . . . fairly debatable,"
itself regarded the restriction as one likely to preserve the public health.!5
Then again, a non-integration statute might be struck down as offending the
equal protection clause. Although courts are extremely liberal in determining
the question of reasonable classification,4 6 the classification set-up to protect the
special interest may be so arbitrary that a court will be unable to find any relation to
the public health. This was the situation in the early Illinois decision 47 invalidating
the Chicago anti-department store ordinance to which previous reference has been
made. Although the ordinance purported to deal with a subject within the scope
of the police power, the regulation of food in the protection of the public health, it
did not require meat and other provisions to be sold only by meat and provision
stores, and did not prohibit all merchandise dealers from selling meat and pro-
visions. Rather, it merely singled out those carrying certain lines of commodities,
in other words, department stores. The distinction was therefore arbitrary, in the
opinion of the Illinois court. A further instance of similar judicial reaction is to be
found, it will be recalled, in the case invalidating the Kansas anti-utility merchan-
dising act
8
Three states, Ohio, New Hampshire and Vermont," have laws which can be
construed to prohibit motor vehicle dealers from combining any other line of busi-
ness with that of the sale of motor vehicles. The Ohio provision is the most con-
clusive in that it would seem specifically to prohibit such integration by providing
,a See discussion and notes 14 and 15, supra.
' See discussion and notes 17, x8 and 2o, supra.
"See notes 40 and 41, supra. It should be noted here, however, that the court was required to
answer both questions in Paramount Pictures, Inc. v. Langer, supra note so, in determining the validity
of a law prohibiting motion picture producers and distributors from owning or operating motion picture
theaters in the state, and answered them both affirmatively. See discussion and note 1i8, infra. Com-
pare, however, the decisions concerning the anti-department store and anti-utility merchandising laws.
4 S. H. Kress & Co. v. Johnson, supra note so, at 7, 8.
S". . . it is established that a distinction in legislation is not arbitrary, if any state of facts
reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it, and the existence of that state of facts at the time
the law was enacted must be assumed." Past v. Van Deman & Lewis Co., supra note ii, at 357;
Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., supra note ii. Followed in S. H. Kress & Co. v. Johnson, supra
note so, at 9.
"
7 Chicago v. Nechter, supra note 14. See also State ex rel. Wyatt v. Ashbrook, supra note 14.
"8 Capital Gas & Electric Co. v. Boynton, supra note i8.
'o Omo GEN. CODE (Baldwin's Throckmorton, 1940) §§63o2-I to 63o2-3; N. H. Laws 1939, c. 47,
amending N. H. PuB. IAws (1926) c. 99, §1, 4; Vt. Laws 1937, act is3, amending VT. Ray. PuB.
Lws (1933) §4986.
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that licenses required of all dealers will be denied to any dealer who does not have
an "established place of business which is used ...solely and exclusively for ...
dealing in motor vehicles."50 Such prohibition is further supported by a definition
of the term "dealer" as meaning "all persons ... regularly engaged in the business
of selling ... motor vehicles at an established place of business which is used solely
and exclusively for ... selling.., motor vehicles.""' The only exemption from the
prohibition is the maintenance, in connection with such establishment, of repair,
accessory, gasoline and oil, storage, parts, service or paint departments, if operated
"for the purpose of furthering and assisting in the business of selling ...motor
vehicles." 52
Although the New Hampshire and Vermont statutes 3 define the term motor
vehicle "dealer" in language almost identical with that of Ohio,"4 such definitions
are not part of, or applicable to, any law requiring the licensing of such dealers.
Instead, they are part of the regular motor vehicle law and seem to be included
primarily for purposes of the provisions concerning the issuance of dealers' regis-
tration plates. As a part of such law, however, the definition necessarily limits the
issuance of special dealer plates to those dealers who maintain a place of business
devoted exclusively to the motor vehicle business. Whether the limitation in con-
nection with such registration-plate provision would successfully operate to keep
motor vehicle dealers from engaging in any other line of business remains an open
question, for neither of these provisions, nor the Ohio prohibition, has yet been
litigated. However, assuming that they were construed so to operate, and certainly
the Ohio provision is mandatory, it is difficult to see how the courts could find any
aspect of the public health, safety, morals or general welfare sufficiently present to
sustain them.
In the field of alcoholic beverages, eleven statesr 5 not taking into consideration
those operating a state monopoly, provide some form of legislative restriction on the
package retailing of such beverages in connection with other lines of business.
Indiana and Rhode Island limit the sale of "hard" liquors by the package to drug
and exclusively liquor stores;56 New Hampshire and certain counties of Maryland,
to drug and grocery stores;57 Missouri to drug, grocery, tobacco, delicatessen and
general merchandise stores;5 8 New York to exclusive liquor stores, permitting beer
to be retailed only by drug and grocery stores;59 while New Jersey authorizes her
0 Omo GEN. CODE (Baldwin's Throckmorton, 1940) §63o2-3.
"Id. §63O2-i. "5 Id. §6302-3. "'Cited supra note 49.
"N. H.: "Dealer: every person . . . in the business of . . . selling . . . motor vehicles . . .who
maintains a place of business devoted exclusively to the motor vehicle business .... ." Vt.: "Dealer:
... a person actively engaged in .. . the business of ... selling ... motor vehicles ... who maintains
a salesroom or garage devoted exclusively to the motor vehicle business .. "
" Ind., Md., Mich., Minn., Mo., N. H., N. J., N. Y., Ohio, Pa., R. I.
"IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns, Supp. X940) § 2-5x8; R. I. Laws 1933, C. 2013, §5B, as amended by
R. I. Laws 1936, c. 2338, §1.
5 7N. H. Laws 1933, C. 99, §9; MD. CoDE ANN. (Flack, 1939) art. 2B, §§6, 30.
"Mo. STAT. ANN. (Supp. 1940) §4525g-2 6.
"N. Y. ALcoHoLic B~vmnaGE CONTROL LAW §§54(4), 63(4), 79.
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cities to limit such sales to exclusively liquor stores.60 Pennsylvania, which operates
a state monopoly system for the retailing of "hard" liquors and wines, permits the
retailing of malt beverages by private business concerns, but in so doing limits such
sales to hotels and restaurants.6 '
Although there is little judicial authority on the constitutionality of such restric-
tive provisions as applied to alcoholic beverages, what does exist is almost wholly
favorable.2 As recently as 1937, the Supreme Court of Illinois upheld an ordinance
prohibiting retail grocery stores and meat markets from selling malt beverages in
bottles or sealed containers "for consumption on the premises."6 In doing so, the
Illinois court declared that prohibiting such integration of lines only to grocery and
meat stores and not to business concerns marketing other types of commodities,
does not create such an arbitrary classification as to render the provision uncon-
stitutional. The purchase of meats and food products being almost a daily neces-
sity, it may be to the good of the city, reasoned the court, to guard women and
children from close contact with the sale of alcoholic beverages :6
While we might differ with the views of the city council as to any injurious results
traceable to the sale of malt liquor ... in the designated class of dealers, it ... is not
within our province to substitute our views for those of the legislative department....
It should be noted that the prohibition involved in this case was against sales for
consumption on the premises, and not package sales for off-premise consumption.
It was on this basis that the court attempted to distinguish the case from the early
decision of Chicago v. Nechter65 which invalidated as discriminatory an ordinance
prohibiting intoxicating liquors from being sold by the package in any place of
business retailing "dry goods, clothing, jewelry or hardware."
However, such a restriction as applied to package sales was upheld as recently
as 1935, in a case66 which declared valid an ordinance prohibiting retail liquor
dealers from engaging in the mercantile or drug business in the same building in
which they operated their liquor business.67
It is apparent that the owner of the two businesses so located may take advantage of this
condition to increase the sales of intoxicating liquors to the public in ways ... he could
not employ if the businesses were otherwise located .. .and while it is possible that the
ordinance .. .may not be based on the soundest sort of wisdom and reason, yet it has
sufficient foundation to make it a matter within the scope of legislative authority.
"N. J. STAT. ANN. (1940) §33:X-12.
"x PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1940) tit. 47, §744-412.
'2Great A. & P. Tea Co. v. Mayor of Danville, 367 Ill. 310, i N. E. (2d) 388 (x937); Tittsworth
v. Akin, n8 Fla. 454, 159 So. 779 (X935); Sloan v. Hutchingson, iao Fla. 747, i63 So. 61 (x935);
Peer v. Board of Excise, 70 N. J. L. 496, 57 Ad. 153 (904); Jacobs Pharmacy Co. v. City of Atlanta,
88 Fed. 244 (C. C. N. D. Ga., 1898).
"0 Great A. & P. Tea Co. v. Mayor of Danville, supra note 62. Cf. Chicago v. Nechter, supra note
14, and discussion of anti-department store laws. "Id. at 318, 11 N. E. (2d) at 392.
"Supra note 14. See, also, the discussion of this case in connection with the anti-department store
laws, supra.
" Tittsworth v. Akin, supra note 62. "Id. at 463, 159 So. at 782.
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An 1898 federal case08 upheld an ordinance prohibiting the sale of liquors by drug
stores. Finally, in Peer v. Board of Excise69 the validity of a restriction of this type
was apparently assumed, when the New Jersey court held that the issuance to a
grocery store of a retail liquor license was a violation of a statute prohibiting such
licenses to stores in which a grocery or other mercantile business is carried on."0
The field of drugs perhaps boasts the longest history of legislation prohibiting
distribution of a certain line of products by those engaged in other lines of busi-
ness. It is well known that all states, as a public health measure, regulate in some
manner the sale of drugs, medicines and poisons. Among other regulatory pro-
visions, nearly all states restrict the sale of such commodities to registered phar-
macists. The ostensible justification for such a restriction is, of course, the protection
of the public health on the theory that the retailing of drugs and similar products
should be limited to those specially trained and skilled in the subject of pharmacy
and drugs.7' Such an absolute restriction is certainly justified in connection with
the compounding of prescriptions. But what of the hundreds of drugs which are
today so standardized that they are merely sold over the counter in the manufac-
turer's original package as any ordinary piece of merchandise?"2 Add to this the fact
that nearly all state pharmacy laws exempt from their terms the sale of so-called
patent or proprietary medicines and sometimes what are designated as ordinary
household remedies, and there seems to be no justification on the ground of public
health for prohibiting merchants other than pharmacists from selling standardized
products in the original package of the manufacturer. 8 This conclusion seems even
more necessary when consideration is given to the fact that many of the pharmacy
laws provide that a pharmacist shall not be held responsible for the quality of drugs
sold in the original package7 4 Furthermore, even though the pharmacy law itself
may contain no such provision, nearly all state pure food and drug laws carry the
usual clause exempting dealers from liability when they can establish a written
guaranty from the manufacturer or distributor."n
These facts are perhaps best illustrated by the recent histbry of the Montana
pharmacy act, which prior to 1939 contained a provision7 limiting to registered
pharmacists the retail sale of all drugs and medicines except patent or proprietary
medicines in the original package, when plainly labeled. The Montana Supreme
J acobs Pharmacy Co. v. City of Atlanta, supra note 62.
6' Supra note 62.
• See, also, Sloan v. Hutchingson, supra note 62, for a dictum supporting the legality of such non-
integration measures.
71 See State v. Stephens, 1o2 Mont. 414, 59 P. (2d) 54 (1936); Kentucky Bd. of Pharmacy v
Cassidy, 115 Ky. 690, 74 S. W. 730 (903).2 See, Kentucky Bd. of Pharmacy v. Cassidy, supra note 7r, at 706, 74 S. W. at 734: "It requires
no more scientific skill to do so than to sell soap or perfumery, or any other like articles. .. ."
" See State v. Stephens, Kentucky Bd. of Pharmacy v. Cassidy, both supra note 71; Arizona v.
Childs, 32 Ariz. 222, 257 Pac. 366, 54 A. L. R. 736 (1927); State v. Donaldson, supra note 9.
"' E.g., Awz. CoDE ANN. (1939) §67-1518; N. M. STAT. ANN. (Courtright, x929 and Supp. 1938)
§§io3-io8; N. C. CoDEi (Michie, 1939) §6665.
"See, OKLA. STAT. ANr. (1936) tit. 63, §260; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1940) tit. 35, §791.
Other states with similar provisions are R. I., S. C., Va., Wyo.8 MoNr. Rav. CoDEs (Anderson & McFarland, 1935) §§317o, 3181, 3184.
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Court held this provision to be unconstitutional because it prevented a grocer
from selling aspirin.77  Such a prohibition, declared that court, does not appear to
preserve the public health in any way since no act of skill or special knowledge is
involved in the sale of a standard article like aspirin. Moreover, the pharmacy law
itself contained a provision absolving the pharmacist from responsibility for the
quality of drugs when sold in the original packages of. the manufacturer.7 8 There-
fore, reasoned the court, there is no justification for restricting the sale of such
articles to registered pharmacists only.79 Another court, invalidating a similar pro-
vision, said:80 "It would be giving pharmacists a monopoly of the business, without
in any manner protecting the public health."
Some 21 states8 ' contain provisions in their pharmacy laws which operate to
prohibit the sale of aspirin by other than registered pharmacists. The same is true
of many standard medicines, for few states exempt from the registered pharmacist
restriction any articles other than patent or proprietary medicines and a rather
standardized list of common household remedies such as alum, aromatic spirits of
ammonia, bay rum, bicarbonate of soda, epsom salts, castor oil, glycerine, essence of
peppermint, peroxide of hydrogen, witch-hazel and similar products
8 2
In the field of chain merchandising are to be found certain forms of horizontal
or product integration that are restricted or penalized without an equivalent burden
being placed upon either single-line chains or independent stores. This discrimination
is effected by exempting from the chain-store tax laws certain product chains only if
the sale of such product constitutes the chain's exclusive, or in some instances, principal,
business. The best known of such exemptions is that granted to pure filling stations,
i.e. stations selling gasoline exclusively83 Such a provision necessarily penalizes
those stations which also deal largely in accessories while not placing a similar
" State v. Stephens, supra note 71.
MoNT. REV. CoDEs (Anderson & McFarland, 1935) §3184.
"ccord: Kentucky Bd. of Pharmacy v. Cassidy, supra note 71; Arizona v. Childs, State v. Donald-
son, both supra note 73. Montana amended its pharmacy law in 1939 to permit the sale of drugs "pre-
pared in sealed packages or bottles by a manufacturer qualified under the laws of the state where
the manufacturer resides." MoNT. R~v. CoDEs (Anderson & Wertz, Supp. X939) §3177.1. Query, as
to whether the use of the term "sealed" would limit the effectiveness of this exemption. Furthermore,
it should be noted that Montana repealed the section absolving the dealer from responsibility for the
quality of drugs sold in the manufacturer's original packages. The new section regulating the quality
of drugs now provides merely that nothing in the state pure food and drug act shall be changed by
the pharmacy law. Id. §3187.3. The pure food law contains the usual exemption clause for dealers
establishing written guaranties. MorNr. lxv. CoDEs (Anderson & McFarland, 1935) §2588.
" State v. Donaldson, supra note 9, at 83, 42 N. W. at 783.
81 Ariz., Calif., Colo., Ill., Ind., Iowa, Mass., Mich., Minn., Mo., Nev., N. H., N. J., N. M., N. Y.,
N. C., N. D., Ohio, S. D., Wis., Wyo.
2 See ARiz. CoDE ANN. (1939) §§67-I5o6, 67-1513, 67-T514; Oa. Com. LAws ANN. (r940)
§§58-bo3, 58-107; N. C. CoDE (Michie, 1939) §6667.
"
5 Fla., Idaho and Minn. exempt pure filling stations. FLA. Comn. GEN. LAWs (Skillman, Supp.
1936) §415 (95b); Idaho Laws 1933, c. 113, §7; MNN. STAT. (Mason, Supp. 1940) §5 887-i8b. Ga.,
Md., Mich. and Miss. exempt dealers whose "principal business" is the sale of gasoline or petroleum
products. GA. CODE ANN. (Park, et a., 1936) §92-i6o2; MD. ANN. CoDE (Flack, 1939) art. 56, §65;
MiCH. STAT. ANN. (Henderson, 1936) §7.482; Miss. CODE ANN. (Supp. 1938) §774. Texas exempts
stores selling and distributing petroleum products and servicing motor vehicles. Tex. Laws 1st Ex.
Sess. 1935, c. 400, §5.
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burden upon independent tire and battery stores. There is also the exemption
found in the Iowa chain-store tax law 4 which is granted to retailers of coal, ice,
lumber, grain, feed and building material provided 95 percent of their total receipts
derive from sales of one or more of those products. With only minor variations,
Minnesota and South Dakota provide exemption clauses almost identical with that
of Iowa. 5 Whatever the purpose in the enactment of these exemption clauses, it
is clear that one of their effects is to favor non-integration of products when the
business is done on a chain basis36
VERTICAL INTEGRATION OF DISTRIBUTING UNITS
Not only have the legislatures been active in prohibiting and restricting forms of
horizontal integration among distributors; activity on behalf of the old-line merchant
has extended to prohibition of the vertical integration of the distributing units
themselves. Such legislative restrictions are most evident in the field of alcoholic
beverages, 32 states prohibiting wholesalers of such beverages from engaging in
retail saleP7 With the exception of io of these laws, four of which contain only
minor exceptions,8 8 and six others the statutory language of which might possibly
be construed otherwise,' the prohibition is absolute.
Another wholesaler-retailer non-integration statute is found in the California
law90 which prohibits wholesalers of frames, lenses, optical supplies, optometric
appliances or devices and kindred products from engaging in the retail business of
filling prescriptions of physicians and surgeons for ophthalmic lenses and kindred
products. To the writers' knowledge, this statute has not been tested in the courts.
Finally, it is interesting to note that in the meat-packing cases"' already discussed,
the general prohibitions of the Sherman Act were used not only to prohibit the com-
bination of unrelated lines of groceries with that of meats, but also to prohibit such
companies from engaging in the retailing of meats. 2 In the second Swift case, 3
the two companies, Swift and Armour, asked that the consent decree be modified
8 IOWA CODE (1939) §6943.128.
"'M'NN. STAT. (Mason, Supp. 1940) §5887-18b (fuel, lumber, building material, gasoline and oils
and grains); S. D. CODE (1939) §57-3403 (same as Minnesota plus dairy products, poultry, electric
current, natural or artificial gas, and telephone service). See also Tex. Laws Ist Ex. Sess. 1935, C. 400,
§5 (exempts those dealing exclusively in lumber and building materials).
" Compare this legislation directed at horizontal chain integration with the discussion, infra, of
prohibitions on vertical chain integration contained in the Patman Bill to divorce chain retailing from
manufacturing. See Stevens, Chain Store Taxation (1940) 33 Proc. Nat. Tax Ass'n 170 for criticism
of the original Patman federal chain-store tax proposal for its failure to exempt accessory-selling as well
as pure filling stations. Stevens clearly views such legislation as presenting the economic issue of the
validity of penalization of horizontal integration.
" Ala., Ark., Calif., Colo., Conn., Fla., Ill., Ind., Iowa, Kan., Me., Mich., Minn., Miss., Mo., Mont.,
N. H., N. J., N. M., N. Y., N. D., Ohio, Ore., R. I., S. D., Tenn., Tex., Vt., Va., Wash., W. Va.,
Wyo.
S Ill., Ind., Mont., N. H., permitting retail sales at the wholesale premises only, or limiting the
wholesaler to one retail license.
"
9 Me., Mich., Miss., N. M., Ohio, Tenn. E.g. Omo CODE ANN. (Baldwin's Throckmorton, 1940)
§6-64-24: "No wholesaler shall have any interest in the business of any retail dealer."
o Cm.sF. Bus. & PIOF. CODE (Deering, Supp. 1939) §2553.5.
" See notes 25 and 26, supra. "'See note 24, supra.
"
5 United States v. Swift & Co., supra note 25.
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to permit not only the wholesaling of groceries, but also the operation of retail
meat markets. Although the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, in which
the petition for such modification was filed, permitted modification to allow the
wholesaling of groceries, a decision subsequently reversed by the United States
Supreme Court,94 it refused to permit the retail sale of meats, a refusal affirmed
by the high Court.9 5 As this Court said, "The one prohibition equally with the
other was directed against abuse of power by the individual units after the monopoly
was over ... "96
VERTICAL INTEGRATION OF PRODUCTION AND DIsTRIBUTION
The legislative weapon has also been used to divorce production from distribu-
tion in certain fields by prohibiting the integration of the function of production
with that of distribution. The greatest activity in this line is again to be found in
the field of alcoholic: beverages. No less than 36 states to some extent prohibit
manufacturers of one or more types of such beverages from engaging in the retail
sale thereof, 7 while 13 states also prohibit them from engaging in the wholesale
business.98  Twenty-two of the states which prohibit retailing by manufacturers
make the prohibition an absolute one, 9 while of the remaining laws, five contain
only minor exceptions, such as permitting the manufacturer to retail his own products
from his manufacturing premises only,'00 and nine contain language which, al-
though not as clear-cut as in the other 22 states, could be construed as prohibiting
such integration.' 0 l Such a complete prohibition is but an extension of the pro-
vision of the Federal Alcohol Administration Act102 prohibiting manufacturers
from holding an interest in retail establishments if it has the effect of inducing the
retailer to purchase the products of the vendor to the exclusion in whole or in part
of competing products.0 3 This limitation, which discloses the original purpose
behind the enactment, is found in only one of the state laws prohibiting manufac-
turer ownership and control of retail establishments. 04
04 ibid. 95 Ibid.
"Id. at 1i7. For the reasons for this separation of functions, see the discussion of the Swift cases
under product-integration, supra.
07The only states not enacting such a prohibition are: Ariz., Ga., Idaho, Ky., La., Mass., Nev.,
N. C., Okla., S. C., Utah, Wis. For an example of this type of prohibition see FLA. CoanP. GEN.
LAWS ANN. (Skillman, Supp. 1936) §4151(228): ". . . no license shall be issued to a manufacturer
. . as a vendor [retailer], nor shall any license be issued to a vendor as a manufacturer. .. "
" Ala., Calif., Conn., Ind., Me., Mich., Neb., N. J., N. D., R. I., Tenn., Tex., Vt. E.g., INS). STAT. ANN.
(Burns, Supp. 1940) §12-515: "No person holding a manufacturer's . . . permit may own . . . any
permit to wholesale alcoholic spirituous beverages .. "
go Ala., Ark., Calif., Colo., Conn., Del., Fla., Ind., Iowa, Minn., Mo., Neb., N. J., N. Y., N. D.,
Pa., S. D., Texas, Va., Wash., W. Va., Wyo. 100 Ill., Md., Mont., N. H., Ore.
101 Kan., Me., Mich., Miss., N. M., Ohio, R. I., Tenn., Vt. Such language usually reads: "No
manufacturer ... may have any interest in the business of any retail dealer." Miss. CODE Am. (Supp.
1938) §2878.
...The Federal Alcohol Administration Act, 49 STAT. 977, 27 U. S. C. A. §§207-212 (1935).
... Id. §5(b)(i), (2); id. §205.
104 N. M. Laws 1939, c. 236, §14 o5(b)(i), (2) prohibiting a producer from acquiring or holding
any interest in any license with respect to the premises of a wholesale or retail liquor dealer for the
purpose of inducing such dealer to purchase alcoholic beverages from such producer to the exclusion of
others.
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Although there is little direct judicial authority on the constitutionality of such
prohibitions, it is probable, owing to the unique legal position of the liquor business,
that the courts will support them. The judicial attitude taken is that °8
the liquor traffic is not a lawful business, except as authorized by express legislation of
the State; that no one has the natural or inherent right to engage therein. . . It is
placed under the ban of law, and it is . . . therefore separated or removed from the
natural rights, privileges and immunities of the citizen.
Furthermore, indirect judicial approval of such a prohibition has been expressed in
a case0 0 which interpreted the Maryland liquor laws as prohibiting a corporation
operating more than one retail drugstore in Baltimore at the time of the law's
enactment, from obtaining a renewal of licenses for stores transferred to that cor-
poration after enactment of the statute, even though these stores had been licensed
by the transferor. In the course of its opinion the Maryland court said:"'7
Section 22, on transfer of licenses, in terms permits "any holder of a license" to ...
sell or assign his license and stock in trade. . . . The provision expresses no limitation
upon the persons who may receive transfers; but it could not be contended that there are
no limitations under the act. In sections 5(1), 28, and 33 there are elaborate provisions
to prevent the holding or control of retail licenses by manufacturers or wholesalers, and
section 22 would not be construed to furnish an easy escape by permitting the ownership
or control by purchase. . . . Transfers would be permitted only to persons not denied
a right to hold licenses.
Efforts to prevent ice cream retailers from engaging, by means of the counter-
freezer, in the manufacture of ice cream have met with defeat in at least one juris-
diction through judicial condemnation,08 and in at least four others through specific
legislative recognition of the use of such freezers.'0 D The restrictive efforts had
taken the form of attempts to apply to such manufacturing the existing stringent
sanitary legislation requiring the sterilization of equipment with live steam, the
use of sloping cement floors with a central drain, and detailed pasteurization pro-
cedures." 0 In the Virginia case it was held that the operator of a drugstore counter-
"' State v. Parker Distilling Co., 236 Mo. 219, 255, 139 S. W. 453, 461 (19xi). Accord: State v.
Wipke, 345 Mo. 283, 133 S. W. (2d) 354 (939); McCarroll v. Clyde Collins Liquors, x98 Ark. 896,
132 S. W. (2d) 19 (1939); Franklin Stores Co. v. Burnett, 12o N. J. L. 596, 1 A. (2d) 25 (1938).
See also, State Board of Equalization v. Young's Market Co., 299 U. S. 59 (1936).
10. Baltimore Retail Liquor Package Stores Ass'n, Inc. v. Kerngood, 17, Md. 426, 189 Ad. 209
('937).
"'"Id. at 432, 189 Ad. at 211. See also, State v. Krawczak, 217 Wis. 593, 6oo, 259 N. W. 6o7, 6o9
(1935), in which the court said, concerning a provision limiting the number of retail beer licenses
which any one person could hold, to two: "It is a matter of common knowledge that the purpose of
limiting the number of Class B beer licenses to two was to prevent a brewer from establishing a
chain of licensed places as was commonly done in pre-prohibition days, the management of which the
brewer controlled and in which sales of beer were limited to the brewer's own product."
1o0 Robertson v. Commonwealth, 168 Va. 752, 191 S. E. 773 (1937), interpreting VA. CODE ANN.
(Supp. 1938) §1=5 as inapplicable to counter freezing.
... MicH. STAT. ANN. (Henderson, 1936) §12.788; Miss. Laws 1940, C. 120, §xo; MONT. REV.
CoDas (Anderson & Wertz, Supp. 1939) §262o.2o(i); Wis. CODE (1939) §970.05.
110 Typical of stringent sanitary regulations for the manufacture of ice cream are ILL. Rv. STAT.
(Smith-Hurd, 1939) c. 48, §§53-57; R. I. Rav. GEN. LAws (1938) c. 26o, §§3, 4, 5. Quite similar to
RESTRICTIONS ON MARKETING INTEGRATION 289
freezer was not engaged in the manufacture of ice cream within the contemplation
of the statute. In so holding, the court said:11
The specifications for the contents of the various kinds of ice cream, for the pasteurization
of the milk used, for the type of building in which the work is to be done, and for the
handling, storage, and transportation of ice cream, all convince us that the framers of
the statute had in mind operations of a much wider character than those performed by
the defendant here.
A great deal of activity, both federal and state, against the integration of produc-
tion, and distribution has also been taking place recently in the motion picture field.
The first law to divorce the exhibition of films from their production appeared on
the statute books of North Dakota in 1937.112 This law, repealed in 1939, made it
unlawful for any motion picture theater to be operated in the state when owned,
controlled, managed or operated, in whole or in part, by any producer or distributor
of motion picture films or in which any producer or distributor had any interest,
direct or indirect, legal or equitable, through stock ownership or otherwise. Viola-
tions of the statute were made subject to injunction or criminal penalties of a
maximum fine of $ioooo, imprisonment for one year, or both. Similar "divorce-
ment" bills have been introduced in the current legislatures of Minnesota and
Nebraska, and are now pending." 3
National legislation with the same purpose was introduced in Congress on April
9, 1940. Although hearings were held and the bill reported out of committee, no
final action was taken at that session of Congress." 4 It has, therefore, been re-
introduced in the present session." 5 This federal bill in its prohibitory clause is
couched in language almost identical to that of North Dakota. It makes it unlawful
for any producer or distributor "engaged in commerce"" 6 to own, operate or have
any interest in, any motion picture theater in any state, territory or the District of
Columbia. Furthermore, in the anti-trust suit in equity commenced by the Depart-
ment of Justice in 1938 against the great theater-owning picture producing com-
panies,"1 the prayer for relief included a request for "theater divorcement." How-
ever, the consent decree entered on November 20, 194o, between the government and
the five theater-owning companies, provides for a three-year trial period during which
the Virginia law construed in Robertson v. Commonwealth, supra note io8, these enactments are there-
fore susceptible to similar judicial interpretation.
... Robertson v. Commonwealth, supra note io8, at 756, 191 S. E. at 775.
'N. D. Laws 1937, c. 165, §§I-7, repealed by' N. D. Laws 1939, c. 202.
... Minn. S. F. 69, 1941; Neb. L. B. 2o8, 1941.
"" S. 3735, introduced by Senator Neely on April 9, 1940. Referred to Senate Committee on the
Judiciary. Hearings before a sub-committee: April 22, May 16, 1940. No final action.
... Re-introduced as S. 185 on Jan. 6, 1941. Referred to same committee.
"' "Engaged in commerce" is defined to include transactions whereby films produced in one state
are shipped by the producer or a subsidiary or affiliated corporation to film laboratories or exchanges in
other states, or sold, leased or licensed by the producer at the point of production to a distributor and
so shipped to film laboratories or exchanges in other states, and in either case distributed by such
exchanges to motion picture theaters. S. 3735, §2(6).
"" U. S. v. Paramount et al. (D. N. Y., July 20, 1938).
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the government may observe whether other provisions of the decree will make
"divorcement" relief unnecessary.
A federal district court, prior to repeal of the North Dakota statute, sustained
that law as a valid exercise of the police power of the state." 8 In doing so, it de-
cided that the act was designed to promote the general welfare of the public by
prohibiting practices which might reasonably be conceived as promotive of monopoly
and restraints of trade. It made no difference, said the court, that the facts of the
present case did not justify a finding that the plaintiffs, motion picture producers,
had a monopoly in North Dakota, were threatening to obtain one, or had been
guilty of any serious abuses with respect to competitors or to the public in North
Dakota. There was" 9
... evidence in the record which justifies an inference of suppression of local competition
in states other than North Dakota by producers having affiliated theaters; and . .. of the
existence of the power and temptation of such producers to engage in practices promotive
of monopoly and restraint of trade.
In the opinion of the court,120 the existence of such power
when coupled with the opportunity and the temptation to use that power, is . . . a
sufficient basis for legislative action to prevent the possibility of its exercise. This must
certainly be so where there is, in addition, evidence of past aggressions.
Here again, as in the meat-packing cases, one finds the courts recognizing as suffi-
cient justification for enforced non-integration, the existence of the power to engage
in monopolistic practices which integration would give.
One other movement worthy of note, in the activity to divorce production from
the retailing function, is found in the bill first introduced in Congress in 1937 by
Mr. Patman' 2l to divorce chain-retailing from manufacturing by preventing "man-
ufacturers of products from offering for sale and selling the same at retail . . .
where the effect of so . . . selling . . . at retail to consumers may be substantially
to lessen competition between such manufacturer and his customers, 122 or tend to
create a monopoly in such line of commerce or to injure, destroy or prevent com-
petition by, a customer or customers of such manufacturer .... "123 The bill would
11. Paramount Pictures, Inc. v. Langer, supra note so, remanded by the Supreme Court of the
United States with directions to dismiss because repeal of the statute had rendered the cause moot.
306 U. S. 619 (z938).
.. Id. at goo. See also Crescent Cotton Oil Co. v. Mississippi, supra note io, which approved an
outright prohibition upon the operation of both cottonseed oil mills and cotton gins by the same cor-
poration on the ground, among others, that the legislation was designed to prevent practices promotive
of monopoly.
.. Ibid. The court here cites and quotes from the second Swift & Co. case, supra note 25, at 116:
.. size carries with it an opportunity for abuse that is not to be ignored when the opportunity is
proved to have been utilized in the past." Compare these attitudes with that of the Kansas court in
holding the utility anti-merchandising law invalid. Capital Gas & Electric Co. v. Boynton, supra note x8.
121 H. R. 4722, 7 5 th Cong., Ist Sess. (1937) introduced Feb. 15, 1937. Referred to the House
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. Hearings before a sub-committee: Dec. 1, 2, 3, 1937
and Jan. 4, 5, 6, 1938. No further action.
12 "Customer of such manufacturer" is defined by §2 to include only a retail dealer who at any
time already is established in the business of offering for sale and selling to consumers commodities
produced or manufactured by such manufacturer. 123 Id. §3.
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make such activities an "unfair method of competition in commerce" within the
meaning of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, and would authorize
the Commission to proceed against any manufacturer it had reason to believe was
using such unfair methods. Possible spread of this idea to state legislative channels
is suggested by the fact that a similar bill has been introduced in the present session
of the California legislature.124
Clearly here the weapon of protective legislation would be wielded in favor of
independent merchants as against the large chains. Integration of production and
distribution would be prohibited not to all in a given line of distribution but only
to those who have "integrated" in the sense of common ownership and control.
But the opposing philosophies remain ever the same. A national association of
oil wholesalers and distributors expressed itself in support of the Patman bill as
follows:125
This association favors the additional principle of severing the manufacturer from
wholesaling as well as retailing....
The whole history of the integrated companies engaged in marketing has been a con-
tinuous series of unfair practices....
Today we have in the tire industry, I understand, a grand scrap between four, five, or
six companies for the business. Evidently, eventually the time will come where there is
going to be but one. I mean, that is the trend of monopoly and I am wondering why
we could not say in advance that these things which tend to create a monopoly shall be
stopped?
And in opposition the old, familiar arguments are used :120
Finally . . . what of its constitutionality? . . . What becomes of the constitutional
liberty of the manufacturer to select his own customers, in bona fide transactions not in
restraint of trade? That right includes the right to sell direct to consumer if the man-
ufacturer chooses ... And wherein does this bill have any relation to the fostering and
promotion of competition, if such be its object? It does not foster and promote com-
petition, but prevents and freezes it. It means that once a manufacturer has sold to a
retailer, he cannot thereafter sell to a consumer direct, in that locality, at the same or a
lower price.... Instead of promoting competition, it would freeze business in the hands
of the middleman....
" Further federal agitation along similar lines is revealed in the recent introduction of a "divorce-
ment" bill for petroleum. S. 170, H. R. 1402, 77th Cong., ist Sess., Jan. 6, 1941.
I ' Statement of P. E. Hadlick, Secretary and Counsel, National Oil Marketers Ass'n, Hearings before
Sub-committee of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H. R. 4722, 7 5 th Cong.,
3d Sess. (1937) 67, 68, 71. See also United States v. Swift & Co., supra note 25; Paramount Pictures v.
Langer, supra note zo; cf. Capital Gas & Electric Co. v. Boynton, supra note 18.
.. Statement of Reynolds Robertson, representing the Warm Air Furnace Manufacturers, Hearings,
supra note 125, at 93.
